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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 20068

v.
Category No. 2

WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLE,
Defendant-Apellant.

REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's petition should be denied because this
Court's opinion supports a conclusion that the admission of the
hypnotically enhanced testimony and exclusion of expert testimony
on the reliability of that evidence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

As the Court stated, the evidence against

defendant was strong.

The evidence defendant presents in his

rehearing petition is minimal and the jury was not obligated to
accept it.
The Court did err in excluding expert testimony on the
reliability of the hypnotically enhanced testimony, however, the
case law presented by defendant does not support the conclusion
he urges, i.e. that violation of the federal right to due process
can never be harmless.

Moreover, this Court did not find that

there was a violation of federal constitutional rights but
avoided the question by finding its exclusion harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Defendant overlooks this critical point and

leaps to the conclusion that there was constitutional error that

cannot be harmless.

Because there is no finding of

constitutional error, and because the error was harmless in any
event, this Court need not grant rehearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND
ANY FACTS THAT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION
THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF
HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY.
Defendant complains that this Court overlooked facts
that he believes should have created doubt in the juror's minds
and that, therefore, this Court should have found that the
erroneous introduction of hypnotically enhanced testimony was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

As this Court noted, it did

not rule on whether the error violated defendant's federal
constitutional rights because it found the error to be harmless.
While the State asserts that there was no federal constitutional
error, analysis of this issue is not necessary because this Court
correctly evaluated the evidence adduced at trial and concluded
that introduction of the hypnotically enhanced evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Without acknowledging the weighty evidence produced by
the State of his guilt, defendant asserts that evidence he
presented should be used by this Court to undermine the jury's
verdict.

Defendant fails to cite to the record for any of the

evidence he refers to and does not even identify what witnesses
Defendant also cites to the Utah Constitution but does not
engage in any separate analysis, therefore, the State will assume
that he asserts that the analysis parallels that of the federal
constitution.

testified to the evidence he claims creates doubt of his guilt.
Normally, this Court will assume correctness of the judgment
where a defendant fails to refer to pages in the record to
support his points on appeal.
1986).

State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah

Further, this Court has stated that failure to cite to

the record is an independent grounds for affirmance, State v.
Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah 1985), and this Court has declined to
rule on arguments that require the Court to supply analysis not
provided by the defendant, State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah
1984).

These general rules are even more applicable in this case

because defendant's failure to supply the Court with record
citations comes at a time when this Court has already carefully
reviewed the entire record.

Where a defendant urges that the

Court erred in its review by overlooking or misapprehending
facts, this Court should not be required to comb the record
looking for the alleged errors.
The Court's opinion adequately addresses the evidence
adduced by the State.

However, a brief review of some of the

most damaging evidence may be helpful.

Several witnesses other

than Matt Fish identified defendant's truck as the one they saw
at the scene or towing Ms. Merrick's car (See testimony of: Dell
Babcock at T. 965-69; David Albrycht at T. 981-83, 987; Francis
Albrycht at T. 997-99, 1001-02; Kent Moffat at T. 1024, 1026-27,
1031-33).

Kent Moffat, who identified defendant's truck as being

the one he saw at the scene, also observed what appeared to him
to be a struggle between a man and a woman and saw the man push
the woman into the car (T. 1021-22).

Moffat's description of the

man fit defendant's description (compare T. 1024, 1032-33 with T.
1130, 1141, 1210).
Hair consistent with defendant's hair was found
embedded in blood on the rearview mirror of Ms. Merrick's car (T.
1258, 1278, 1299).

While other hair inconsistent with

defendant's may have been located in the car, that fact does not
disprove that defendant was the perpetrator nor even make it less
likely.

All that it establishes is that other people were inside

Ms. Merrick's car at some unknown time, not that any of these
people were the perpetrator.
Also damaging to defendant's protestations of innocence
are that he told inconsistent stories about whether he was at the
scene of the crime (T. 1186, 1202, 1204, 1369, 1373, 1746), that
he changed his appearance (T. 1130, 1141, 1210, 1757), and that
he fled upon being informed that the police were getting close to
him (T. 1202-03, 1211-12, 1366-71).

Also significant is

defendant's admission that he was present at the scene even
though he denied involvement (T. 1712-17).
All of this evidence, taken together, established
overwhelmingly that defendant killed Sidney Ann Merrick.

This

Court need not, therefore, grant a rehearing to reconsider the
minimal facts defendant offers as leaving a reasonable doubt of
his guilt.

POINT II
THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
THAT A DENIAL OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS CANNOT
BE HARMLESS ERROR.
Defendant assumes that exclusion of expert testimony on
the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony is a violation
2
of federal due process.

Based upon this assumption, he then

asserts that such an exclusion can never be harmless error.

His

argument is unsubstantiated and should not be the basis for
rehearing this case.
At the outset, it is important to reiterate that this
Court declined to rule on whether exclusion of the expert
testimony was a violation of defendant's federal constitutional
rights.

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the

error was of constitutional magnitude, it could still be harmless
and this Court's ruling should stand.
Defendant cites Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986), for
the proposition that some constitutional error cannot be
harmless.

While Clark stated that general proposition, it was by

no means referring specifically to the exclusion of expert
testimony on the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony.
Nor has defendant cited any cases directly on point.

As Clark

emphasized, it is the fact-finding process that is implicated in
a harmless error analysis and if errors do not contribute to the

See note 1, supra.

verdict, they are harmless.

478 U.S. at 578, citing Delaware v.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) and Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) .
Accordingly, if the defendant had counsel and
was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there
is a strong presumption that any other errors
that may have occurred are subject to
harmless-error analysis. The thrust of the
many constitutional rules governing the
conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that
those trials lead to fair and correct
judgments. Where a reviewing court can find
that the record developed at trial
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the interest in fairness has been satisfied
and the judgment should be affirmed.
Clark, 478 U.S. at 579.
This case is distinguishable from Halloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court
held that representation by an attorney of co-defendants with a
conflict of interest could never be harmless.

In Halloway, the

court noted that where an error occurs at trial, the reviewing
court can readily identify its scope and have confidence in its
ability to pursue "its relatively narrow task of assessing the
likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations
of jury."

435 U.S. at 490. Because an attorney might refrain

from doing things on behalf of one client that might
detrimentally affect the other client, the court felt a harmless
error analysis was not useful in Halloway since these things
would not be evident in the record.

In this case, this Court was

able to undertake a harmless error analysis because it was able
to evaluate whether the testimony that the expert would have
attacked was critical to the jury verdict.

The interest in

fairness has been satisfied here and this Court should deny
rehearing.
The exclusion of this testimony was harmless because
the jury had before it the ability to test the reliability of Mr.
Fish's testimony.

The jury was presented with a prehypnosis

statement from Mr. Fish (R. 679, ex. A ) . From this statement the
jury was able to determine what were the differences in Mr.
Fish's memory before and after hypnosis.

They were also

presented with a transcript of Mr. Fish's statements made under
hypnosis (R. 680-92, T. 1064-65).

From this transcription, the

jury could determine what new details came out during hypnosis.
While Mr. Fish testified to more details at trial than
were present in his prehypnosis statement, the jury heard these
same details from other witnesses.

The fact that the word

"Apache" was written on the truck was also testified to by Dell
Babcock (T. 968). Defendant's truck was identified by several
other witnesses (See discussion in Point I, supra).

The victim's

car was identified by other witnesses as the one being towed and
these witnesses also identified the towing vehicle as defendant's
truck (David and Francis Albrycht at T. 982, 998, 987, 1001-02,
and Kent Moffat at T. 1026, 1031-32).

Thus, the overwhelming

evidence of guilt makes it unlikely beyond a reasonable doubt
that the result of the trial would have been different if the
expert had testified.

State v. Tuttle, No. 20068 slip op. at 15

(Utah App. 12, 1989).

The testimony of Mr. Fish was corroborated

by other witnesses and was not critical to the State's case since
defendant admitted his presence at the scene, thus, any testimony
that miqht have undermined its credibilitv was not critical.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to deny defendant's petition for rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /V/fr

day of July, 1989.
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Attorney General
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